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Eastern Partnership and ǣǮǯ
back in the eastern region 
Elena Korosteleva 
Abstract 
Drawing on the post-ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůŝƐƚ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ :ĞŶŶǇ ĚŬŝŶƐ ?  ?  ? ? ? ?
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ?ƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐĞƚƐƚŽĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůůǇƌĞƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞ
geo-strategic dynamics of the EU-Russia relations in the context of the eastern region. It 
ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞh ?ƐĂŶĚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂ-led Eurasian (EEU) projects may be appealing in 
ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƚŚĞŝƌǀŝƐŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ?ĞĂƐƚĞƌŶŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĞůĨ-centred 
and exclusionary. The root of the problem, as this paper contends, is that the EU and the 
EEU struggle to imagine a new social order, which would give a relational value to the Other 
as pari passu, and assume cooperation as an interplay of differing normalities rather than 
ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŶŽƌŵƐ ĂŶĚ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? WƌĞƐĞntly, the EU and Russia find themselves 
locked in parallel ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ? ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ? ĞĂĐŚ
attempting to institutionalise their respective political orders, and not by way of 
contestation  W  ‘the political ? W but rather by a depoliticised means of technocracy or 
ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐ ?ŝĨĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?ŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƐĞƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ŝĨ  ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?is 
not back on the agenda.   
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back in the eastern region 
 
Introduction  
:ƵƐƚŽǀĞƌĂ ĚĞĐĂĚĞ ĂŐŽ ? ƚŚĞǁĞƐƚĞƌŶǁŽƌůĚďĞĐĂŵĞ ĐĂƉƚŝǀĂƚĞĚďǇWƵƚŝŶ ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨĂ 'ƌĞĂƚĞƌ
Europe, which he delivered at the Bundestag on 25 September 2001. In particular, he declared:  
 
/ƚ ŝƐ ŵǇ Ĩŝƌŵ ĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶ ƚŽĚĂǇ ?Ɛ ƌĂƉŝĚůǇ ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ǁŽƌůĚ ? ? ƵƌŽƉĞ ĂůƐŽ ŚĂƐ ĂŶ
ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ZƵƐƐŝĂ ? ƵƌŽƉĞ ǁŝůů ŽŶůǇ ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞ ŝƚƐ
reputation of a strong and truly independent centre of world politics ? if it succeeds in 
bringing together its own potential and that of Russia (Putin 2001).  
 
This discourse ŽĨĂ  ‘ƵŶŝƚĞĚ'ƌĞĂƚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞ ? spanning from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans,1 
was also echoed by the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi in 2002, in 
preparation for the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) a year later. He famously 
stated:  ‘I want to see a "ring of friends" surrounding the Union.., from Morocco to Russia and 
ƚŚĞůĂĐŬ^ĞĂ ?dŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞƉŝĞĐĞof this proposal is a common market embracing the EU and its 
ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ? ?(2002, emphasis original). 
 
Ten years on, these strategic visions of the EU and Russia have translated into concrete policies 
effectively targeting the same region. In particular, with the launch of the Eastern Partnership 
Initiative (EaP) in 2009 the ENP acquired a much-needed regional focus to begin forging a 
Neighbourhood Economic Community (NEC) with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, by way of action plans, roadmaps, and Association Agreements (AA), with a 
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varied degree of success (Casier et al. 2014). Separately, the EU also pursued a Partnership for 
Modernisation with Russia working towards a successor accord for the 1997 Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, and a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), once conditions were met 
(Commission 2008 p.2). Conversely, Russia has advanced to foresee the arrival of the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) by 2015, aiming to re-integrate the Commonwealth of Independent States 
 ?/^ ?ŝŶƚŽ ‘ĂƐŝŶŐůĞ ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝĐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁŚŝĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚůĞĂ ƚŽĂĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŽĨŚĂƌŵŽŶŝŽƵƐ
ĐŽŵŵŽŶƐƉĂĐĞƐŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂŶĚďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚŝƐŐŝŐĂŶƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶ ? (Putin 
2005). This integration has also envisaged ĂŶĞǀĞŶƚƵĂů ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƵƌĂƐŝĂŶhŶŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞhƚŚĂƚŝƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůůǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚĂŶĚďĂůĂŶĐĞĚ ?ƚŽŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞĂŐůŽďĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ?WƵƚŝŶ 
2011). In short, within a relatively short period of time, the idea of a  ‘>ĞƐƐĞƌƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?'ƌŽŵǇŬŽ
2014)  W ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?Ă  ‘^ŵĂůůĞƌƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƚŚĞh ? ? ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚ ?  W 
became almost inconceivable and even backward, both in rational and emotive terms. 
 
And yet, by 2014, both visions clashed grinding to a halt. What seemingly started as another 
innocuous signature of the AA with Ukraine in 2013, a few months later fermented into 
ƵƌŽŵĂŝĚĂŶ ?ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨƌŝŵĞĂ ?ĐŝǀŝůƵŶƌĞƐƚĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐůĂŝŵƐďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶŝƐƚs 
in eastern UkrainĞ ? dŚĞ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ƋƵŝĐŬůǇ ĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚ Ă Đŝǀŝů ǁĂƌ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂŶĚ ǁŝƚŚin a year 
claimed nine thousand lives (Guardian 2015). Consequently, the EU ?Ɛ diplomatic ties with Russia 
ceased being replaced by economic sanctions and an immovable policy gridlock vis-à-vis each 
other and over the region. 
 




First, ƚŚĞ h ĂŶĚ ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ƚĂƌŐĞƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ? ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚůǇ
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ ‘in parallel rather than in harmŽŶǇǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ƌĂŐŶĞǀĂĂŶĚtŽůĐǌƵŬ ? ? ? ? p .3) 
being destined to come to a conflict without a reciprocal dialogue. Furthermore, while the 
conflict was unfolding, both protagonists advanced their isolated interactions ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ?
region almost ĂƐ ‘ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂƐƵƐƵĂů ? ?in an attempt to institutionalise their respective social orders 
by way of technocratic expertise transference as in the case of the EU, and/or hard bargaining, 
compulsion and embargo on the part of Russia. This parallel engagement, which could be 
described as  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ŝŶĚŬŝŶƐ ?ƚĞƌŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? Wthe process of maintenance and expansion of an 
established social order  W if anything, has contributed to further aggravation of the EU-Russia 
relations rather than rendered suitable solutions to the seemingly irreconcilable stand-off.  
 
Second, the EU-Russia relations over Ukraine and the wider neighbourhood have also revealed a 
glaring lack of othering as a process of recognising and engaging with one another and especially 
with the recipient parties, 2  with the purpose of developing compatible and cooperative 
knowledge regimes. The lack of othering has clearly prevented the protagonists from  ‘sharing ?
and reconciling their grand visions not only with each other, but more importantly  W with 
ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ?regional needs and aspirations. Being confident in their individual appeals, both the EU 
and Russia have naturally assumed a premature closure of an ideological debate over the choice 
for an integration course, which, without proper public legitimation, has naturally led to a 
normative clash of rule transference by the established orders in the neighbourhood P  ‘ƚŚĞ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ĂƐ Ă ŵŽŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƵŶĚĞĐŝĚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞn avidly amiss in the EU and 




In light of the above, this article sets to examine and re-think the geo-strategic dynamics of the 
EU-Russia relations, in the context of the deeply destabilised and evidently contested eastern 
region. It argues that both the EU and the EEU have failed to imagine a new social order, which 
would give a relational value to the Other as pari passu, and assume cooperation as an interplay 
ŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŶŽƌŵĂůŝƚŝĞƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐƵďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽŽŶĞ ?Ɛhegemonic set of norms and authority. 
At the heart of this paper is the need to recognise and understand power as ideological and 
contingent ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚƚĂŬĞ  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĂƐa given but rather as  ‘a ƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?
(Donald and Hall in Edkins 1999 p.2). Power relations are inherently dependent on a particular 
social order (norms and rules) ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞŶĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐĞĚ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞǁŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŚĞĂƌƚƐĂŶĚŵŝŶĚƐ ?
first by way of contestation and acceptance  W  ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? W before shifting from instalment to 
maintenance of social order, by a means of bureaucracy and technocratic agreements. 
 
dŚŝƐŝƐǁŚĞƌĞĂŵŽƌĞĚŝƐĐĞƌŶŝďůĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?
is needed, which should render a better understanding of the EU-Russia relations, and help find 
suitable solutions to the ongoing conflict and policy gridlock over the contested region. If we take 
 ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĂƐĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŽƌĚĞƌŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?  ‘ƚŚĞ
pŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?then would represent an opportunity for contestation, openness and undecidability, 
 ‘ǁŚĞŶĂŶĞǁƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌĚĞƌŝƐŽŶƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚĞŶŝƚƐůŝŵŝƚƐĂƌĞďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚ ?
(Edkins 1999 p.126). This is where the EU and the EEU neighbourhood policies, as this article 
believes, are presently located. In particular, much of the EU politics in the neighbourhood to 
date has been essentially depoliticised, having taken for granted the need for continuing 
legitimation and agitation for the European course. Instead, it prioritised promotion of EU 
normative convergence by way of technocracy and conditional rule transference. With the 
ůĂƵŶĐŚŽĨƚŚĞh ?ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?ZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐ ŝƚƐŽǁŶ  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ŝŶĂŶ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ
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assertive manner and often by way blackŵĂŝů ?ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŝŽŶĂŶĚĞŵďĂƌŐŽ ?dŚĞƐĞ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
EU and Russia however have failed to speak to each other, and to engage with the region to seek 
legitimation and complementarity, thus causing conflict and deadlock in nudging its stabilisation.   
 
By placing our analysis witŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ĨƌĂŵĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ?this article argues that 
power could and should be exercised in many different ways, and their interface, especially when 
contested, should be more nuanced than is currently understood. While daily politics is an 
important instrument for institutionalising an agreed political order, it generally affords no room 
ĨŽƌƌĞĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ĂŶĚďĞĐŽŵĞƐ ‘ĚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĚĞƉƌŝǀĞĚŽĨƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽƚŚŝŶŬ
 ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞďŽǆ ? ? ‘dŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ? on the other hand, allows to re-imagine and experiment with 
the emerging power arrangements, especially when such are deeply contested, as in the case of 
Ukraine, and the wider eastern region. This may engender new and/or additional social space to 
help overcome the limitations of the existing social order, and avail new opportunities for 
dialogue and cooperation  W if  ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?is brought back on the agenda.  
 
What follows next is our brief discussion of the conceptual framework which unpacks the nexus 
ŽĨ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ŝŶĂĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐĂůŵĂŶŶĞƌ ?ĂŶĚalso contextualises the key tenet of this 
paper  W othering. A subsequent section then examines the disconnects and advantages of 
othering ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h ĂŶĚ ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ, before closing the debate with further 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?for resolving the EU-Russia impasse in the 




ǮǯǮǯ in the context of othering: framing the concept and 
its application 
 
In her seminal work, Jenny Edkins (1999 p. ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵƵĐŚŽĨǁŚĂƚǁĞĐĂůů “ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?ƚŽĚĂǇ ?
ŝƐ ŝŶ ŵĂŶǇ ƐĞŶƐĞƐ  “ĚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ ? Žƌ  “ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝǌĞĚ ? ? ? ƚŚƵƐ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ĂŶ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ
intellectual debate and contestation by differing and proliferating subjectivities. Instead, often 
forgetting about the relational nature of power politics, we tend to objectivise the outside world 
as a simple extension of our own Self, at the expense of the rationalities and subjectivities it has 
to offer. While this view of the outside is perhaps natural to a human deƐŝƌĞŽĨ  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?
inferring control and ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƌĂƐ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŝƚ ?ŽĨ  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ ? ŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
composite of power institutions and their need to dominate and regulate the outside (2007 
p.108-9); this logic is nevertheless potentially perilous.      
 
The principal caveat of this kind of projection of the Self is that it is invariably unilateral 
perpetuating a parochial cycle of knowledge production that centres on the Self (no matter how 
worthy it may be), and reducing the boundaries of knowledge to a simple transmission and 
ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ĞůĨ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ǁŚĂƚ  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĐŽŵĞ ƚŽĚĂǇ ŝŶ
international relations, as Edkins argues  W deprived of contestation, and displaced by a 
technology of expertise and bureaucracy, in the promotion of an unreciprocated and seemingly 
agreeable order. &ŽƵĐĂƵůƚŚŽǁĞǀĞƌƌĞŵŝŶĚƐƵƐƚŚĂƚĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨ  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ ?ǁŝƚŚits 
inherent need to regulate, is an understanding that power can only work through the practices 
of freedom (a calculated rationality) and as a process of interacting with the Other. For Rose 
(1999 p. ? ? ?ďǇĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ‘ƚŽŐŽǀĞƌŶŝƐƚŽƉƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƐĞƚŚĞĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚ ? ?ǁŚŝůĞDŝůůĞƌ
and Rose (2008 p. ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƉŽǁĞƌŝƐŶŽƚƐŽŵƵĐŚĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨŝŵƉŽƐŝŶŐĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐƵƉŽŶ
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ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌ ‘ŵĂŬŝŶŐƵƉĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨďĞĂƌŝŶŐĂŬŝŶĚŽĨƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĚĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ? ?Hence 
the task of this paper is to radically rethink the rationality of the ENP in the eastern 
ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚǁŚŝůĞĐůĞĂƌůǇĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ŝŶĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽ
ďƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐ ?ďĂĐŬŝŶ ? 
 
ĚŬŝŶƐĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ŝƐŝŶĞƐƐĞŶĐĞƚŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƌather than the process of contestation: it 
is the debate that occurs within the limits set by the new order (1999 p.126), when a legitimate 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ĞŵĞƌŐĞƐ ? ƚŽ ĞǆĞƌƚ  ‘Ă ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐ ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
recognised expertise and endoƌƐĞĚ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ?ƌŝƚƵĂůƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ
ŽĨ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?  ?/ďŝĚ p. ? ? ? /ƚ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ĨŽƌ ŚŽǁ ƉŽǁĞƌ  ‘ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐ Ă ƐŽĐŝĂů ŽƌĚĞƌ ĂŶĚ Ă
ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? p.  ? Žƌ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ ŚŽǁ  ‘ŽŶĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĨŽƌŵ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ
another ĞŵĞƌŐĞƐĨƌŽŵĂƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞ ? ?dŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽŶĞ
ŶĞĞĚƐƚŽĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ĂƐĂprocess of struggle and mutations of one social order into 
ƚŚĞŶĞǆƚ ?tŚĂƚƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞƚŚĞƌĞĂĨƚĞƌ ?ŝƐŶŽƚ “ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ?ďƵƚĂƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?
ĂŶĚ ŝƌŽŶŝĐĂůůǇ ?  ‘ƚŚŝƐ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ŝƐ ǁŚĂƚǁĞ ĐĂůů  “ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?  ?/ďŝĚ p.5). As Edkins 
ĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ǁŚĞŶĂŶĞǁƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌĚĞƌŝƐůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ ?ŝƚƚŚĞŶ ‘ƐĞƚƐŽƵƚĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ
specific account of what counts as politics and defines other areas of social life as not ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?
(Ibid p.2). Politics, therefore, is more concerned with the social rather political space, in the 
ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞ ŶĞǁ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ŵĂŬĞ ƚŚĞŵ ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ ?  ‘dŚe 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞďĞĐŽŵĞƐƌĞŵŽǀĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ W  ‘ĚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐĂĐůŽƐƵƌĞŽĨĂŶ
ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĚĞďĂƚĞ ?ĂŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨĨŽƌŐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ĂŶĚŵĂŬŝŶŐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? 
 
&ƌŽŵƚŚŝƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŝƚŝƐƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ŝŶ a deeply contested ideological 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĞĂƐƚĞƌŶƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? of the EU and the EEU respectively 
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which should give this revision a new meaning. A decade-long struggle of both regional projects 
running in parallel, but targeting the same region, demonstrates the dangers and the 
consequences of such premature ideological closure, in a situation when political space still 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ  ‘ǁŝŶŶŝŶŐ-ŽǀĞƌ ?, canvassing and legitimation by the peoples of the region, as well as 
reciprocation and engagement by the protagonists themselves.  
 
Instead, as the practice attests, the ENP and the EEU have found themselves locked in Self-centric 
 ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ŽĨboundary expansion rather than ŝŶ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?contest of their rationale and 
prospects for cohabitation and reciprocity. Their parallel development, without seeking 
complementarity and dialogue, has been a  ‘ticking bomb ?, invariably lending itself to an eventual 
clash of not so much the visions  W ƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞƐƚŝůůƉĞƌƚŝŶĞŶƚĨŽƌĞƐĞĞŝŶŐĂ ‘ƵŶŝƚĞĚ'ƌĞĂƚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞ ?
(Putin 2005)  W but politics-driven actions, implicating dichotomous requirements by both sides 
towards the production and maintenance of two differing orders.  
 
This paper however contends that there should be another way in this highly intense and 
polycentric world of power relations whereby cohabitation rather than exclusionary hegemony, 
which by its very nature is always ĚŝƐƌƵƉƚŝǀĞ ‘in trying to secure iƚƐĞůĨ ? ?'ƌĂŵƐĐŝŝŶĚŬŝŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?
p.127), ought to be imagined by rethinking the place of ƚŚĞ ‘KƚŚĞƌ ? as the interplay and alignment 
of different norms.  
 
If we are to open ideological offerings to contestation, a more nuanced understanding of 
othering is imperative.3 In reality, however, a modern Self-dominated world of politics often 
tends to forget and treat the Other as a mere extension of its own Self, or if resisted, as a threat 
(Diez 2005), to be nudged towards a prototype of Self.  In either case, othering as a process of 
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recognition and reckoning between the Self with the Other, is clearly missing, leaving the world 
of sovereign Selves, protected by power resources, too vulnerable to the unknown and rightfully 
challenging outside ? dŚĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ŶŽƚ ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐ ? ŝŐŶŽƌŝŶŐ Žƌ  ‘ĨŽƌŐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ?the Other are 
enormous, as the ongoing conflict over Ukraine and the eastern region once again testifies. 
 
First, treating the outside as a mere extension of the Self leads to forgetting what the real world 
is, rather than what it should be ?dŚŝƐ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞ-ŽƵƚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ, as often exercised by the EU and 
Russia, may lead to the diminished need for external learning, and natural overestimation of its 
own worth. In this order of things then, a resistant and rebellious Other may come back as a 
shock, leaving the Self insecure and unprepared to resolve the issue of dealing with  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ-ŶĞƐƐ ? ?
as, for example, in the case of the EU vis-à-vis the neighbourhood, confronted by the assertive 
presence of Russia.   
Second, if the Other is forgotten, the  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?of the Self becomes naturally domineering and 
increasingly involved, as Edkins (1999) argues, in the production of ŝƚƐŽǁŶ  ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?about the 
outside this way compensating for its lack of knowledge about the Other. What emerges then is 
Ă ‘ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?Žƌ ‘ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŐĂŵĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚďĞĐŽŵĞƐŶŽƚĂƚŽŽů ‘ƚŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝĚĞĂƐĂďŽƵƚƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?ďƵƚ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌ Ă ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ ĞŵďĞĚĚŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ  ? ? ŝŶ Ă ƉƌĞ-ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?
(Edkins 1999 p.22) serving one purpose only  W to convey ƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƌƚĞĚ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?and reinforce the 
boundaries of the established order. ŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĂƐĂ ‘said ƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŬŶŽǁŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?
could become ĂƚŽŽůŽĨĞŝƚŚĞƌƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽƌŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŽƌůĚŽĨƐĂŝĚƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?, to which the 
increasingly aggressive case of Russian propaganda attests (Sherr 2015; Giles 2015). 
Finally, in this dominated world of Self often defined by power resource differentials, what is left 
to the Other, if not to fend for itself? From the perspective of a hegemonic Self, the power 
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struggle is intrinsic, incentivising the outsiders either to increase their power resource 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂůƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĂƌŵƐĂĐĐĞůĞƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞh^ĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ ? ?Žƌ ‘ĚŝƌĞĐƚ
tacit pressure or open action towards the decrease of power differentials responsible for their 
ŝŶĨĞƌŝŽƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?ůŝĂƐ ? ? ? ? p.22). Russia vis-à-vis the EU, in the context of Ukraine demonstrates 
a similar kind of urge to increase its power resource differential, this way aiming to reduce its 
own perception of inferiority, and to gain more credibility within its own wider Self (e.g. Eurasian) 
group. 
Whichever the outcome, the world of the Self without the Other as pari passu, dominated by the 
urge to maintain an established social order, is not a safe and stable place.4 It perpetuates the 
logic of exceptionalism, inequality and naturally, of expansionism. More so, it becomes further 
and further removed from the reality itself by way of producing and exporting the dogmatised 
 ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐĨĂŶƚĂƐŝƐĞĚƌĞĂůŝƚǇƚŽƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?^ƵĐŚǁŽƌůĚ, as the EU-Russia conflictual 
relations show, is unsustainable, and our analysis below exposes its limitations and costs. The 
task ahead is to try and  ‘ƌĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝƐĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ? ?ĂŶĚƚƵƌŶŝƚ ŝŶƚŽĂŶŽƉĞŶƐƉĂĐĞŽĨĚĞďĂƚĞ and 
reconciliation ?Ɛ:ĞŶŶǇĚŬŝŶƐƉƵƚƐŝƚ P ‘/ƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨĞŵĂŶĐŝƉĂƚŝŶŐƚƌƵƚŚĨƌom every system 
of power but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, within which it 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? p.140). This implicates the urgency to equate the Self and the Other, in their 
relational need for one another, and to open up a new space  W  ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? W for dialogue and 
complementarity, to ensure ƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ survival and the achievement of ever Greater Europe.  
   
The EU and Russia: colliding visions or complementary regional efforts 
Let us now explore the logics and discourses of Self-assertion and othering in the eastern 
ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?by framing and explaining their relations 
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ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ?dŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚŚĞůƉƵƐƐĞĞƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚƐ
in the proceƐƐŽĨƚŚĞhĂŶĚƚŚĞh ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?    
dŚĞh ?Ɛ^ĞůĨĂŶĚits othering effort in the eastern neighbourhood 
tŝƚŚƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚƐ ‘ƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ŝŶ ? ?3, the EU registered its explicit interest in the 
eastern region and articulated its vision for a more stable Europe, by way of forging a ring of 
 ‘ǁĞůů-ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚ ?ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ P ‘Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the 
European interest that countries on our borders are well-ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚ ?(ESS 2003:7), in line with its 
understanding of a secure and stable social order.   
 
At the same time, the vision lacked a purposeful and more importantly, reciprocated strategy to 
support these intentions.5 The initial policy resembled more of a generalist security-predicated 
aid package, primarily intending to safeguard the EU borders while expanding its influence 
(Youngs 2009). Moreover, it also adopted ĂŶ  ‘ĞŶůĂƌŐĞŵĞŶƚ-ůŝƚĞ ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ  ?Popescu and Wilson 
2009) to give the region a distinct European direction premised on the EU norms and 
requirements. How did it fit with ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĂ ‘'ƌĞĂƚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚďǇWƵƚŝŶ the 
early 2000s? The vision did not find its way to the official documents, and was only implicitly 
mentioned in the later iterations of the ENP  W via a multilateral track to enhance intra- and inter-
regional cooperation with third parties. Essentially, the policy was developing in isolation from 
the Russian initiative, and was increasingly seen as a set of instruments6 intending, on the one 
hand, to reform the region by the EU standards which may lead to the formation of the NEC; and 
on the other, to engage Russia into some form of strategic partnership. The latter soon 
progressed, albeit slowly, into a Four Common Spaces Agreement in 2005 to extend in five years 
into a Partnership for Modernisation (Council 2010).   
13 
 
Predictably, the ENP was struggling to find traction with the eastern neighbours, who historically 
saw themselves at the cross-roads of Eurasian space, to which a recent diplomatic history of 
Ukraine ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚďŽƚŚƉŽǁĞƌƐ ? thoroughly examined by Dragneva and Wolczuk (2015), 
serves as testimony. An emerging sense of rivalry between the two regional powers  W the EU and 
Russia - in the neighbourhood has been registered across the neighbourhood by wider public 
opinion7 ĂƐ ‘ĂůĂƌŵŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƵŶĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĂƐ
the latest events in Ukraine illustrate, has now led to a long-term instability in the neighbourhood, 
and the disruption of global order. 
To make its policy more adaptive and its governance more effective, the EU had to go through a 
number of policy iterations (Korosteleva 2016). By 2009 it launched the EaP, giving the policy an 
increasingly regional focus and a more differentiated approach, which by 2011 (its 3rd iteration) 
branched out into a set of highly technocratic road maps, Action Plans, Association agendas, and 
Association Agreements  W in short, a complex matrix of enablement to be able to reach out to 
different levels, actors and existing structures within the neighbourhood space. As the policy 
progressed with the negotiation of AAs, it was clear that the EU has fully embarked on the path 
of a region-building politics (Delcour 2015) with a purpose to converge the region to the EU 
standards. At its core was the promotion of low-key technocratic strategies of engagement to 
codify an EU-centred agenda into a series of AA requirements, with some profound implications 
for the wider region.8    
Has the policy, especially in its advanced stages preceding the conflict in 2013, made any 
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽĐŽŶŶĞĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘'ƌĞĂƚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞ ?, as well as debate and engage 
with the parallel developments in the Eurasian Union? According to the House of Lords ? (HoL) 
inquiry into the EU-Russia relations (2015), evidence revealed that there was little effort on both 
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sides to engage with one another to develop a joint vision, especially of much-wanted economic 
reforms. While negotiating an AA and especially the part of a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with Ukraine, ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ>ƵŬ ?ǇĂŶŽǀ ?ŚĂŝƌŵĂŶ ?ŽƵŶĐŝůŽŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
ĂŶĚ ĞĨĞŶĐĞ WŽůŝĐǇ ?  ‘ƚŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ  “ŶĞǀĞƌ ƐŚŽǁĞĚ ĂŶǇ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐ ? ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ
ecoŶŽŵŝĐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ? ?ďĞŝŶŐĞŝƚŚĞƌ ‘ŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ďůƵŶƚ ?ďǇway of pointing to the Russian side 
 ‘/ƚŝƐŶŽƚǇŽƵƌďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?/ƚŝƐŽƵƌďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ ?Ś ? ? p.2). When Russian hostility to the 
project became apparent, the EU, as the HoL report argues, undertook the following two steps, 
ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĨůĞĐƚĂƌĂƚŚĞƌ ‘ĚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞh-centred order: one is that it continued 
pursuing the negotiations over ƚŚĞ ‘ǁŝƚŚƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞ
ďƌŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĂƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ?ĂŶĚƚǁŽ W separately, the Commission engaged in a 
ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂŽŶƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ ?ďƵƚƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵ
to engage in a  ‘ƚƌŝůĂƚĞƌĂůƚĂůŬ ?ŽǀĞƌhŬƌĂŝŶĞ ?Ɛnegotiation of the AA. According to a senior Russian 
official,  ‘the EU did everything to facilitate the power change in Kiev; while the bloodshed could 
ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĂǀŽŝĚĞĚ ?ŝĨďŽƚŚƐŝĚĞƐůŝƐƚĞŶĞĚƚŽĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĐoncerns (Ibid) and allowed some space 
ĨŽƌĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ? ?ƚŽĞŶŐĞŶĚĞƌĂĐŽŵƉƌ ŝƐĞ. The ,Ž> ?Ɛconclusions of the inquiry 
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇƐƚĂƚĞĚ P ‘/ƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨhƚƌĂĚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞ
having an economic ďĂƐŝƐ ? ǁĞƌĞ ĂůƐŽ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ? ? tŚŝůĞ ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
concerns, the Commission was putting forward free-market liberal arguments. Both sides were 
ƚŽƐŽŵĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚĂůŬŝŶŐƉĂƐƚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?/ďŝĚ ?Ś ? ? p.6). Furthermore, the HoL insisted:  
AŶ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ  ?ƐůĞĞƉ-ǁĂůŬŝŶŐ ? ǁĂƐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌƵŶ-up to the crisis in Ukraine, and 
important analytical mistakes were made by the EU. Collectively, the EU overestimated the 
intention of the Ukrainian leadership to sign the AA, appeared unaware of the public mood 
in Ukraine, and, above all, underestimated the depth of Russian hostility towards the AA. 
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While each of these factors was understood separately, [no institution] connected the dots 
(Ibid p.5). 
It is evident from the above that the EU ?Ɛreformist ambitions in the neighbourhood, 
underpinned by its grand vision of a well-governed space from Lisbon to Vladivostok (Füle 2013) 
seem to speak primarily ƚŽƚŚĞh ?Ɛown interests, being effectively disconnected from a similar 
initiative which has been unfolding in parallel across the post-Soviet space, to which we now turn.  
ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐSelf and its othering effort in the eastern neighbourhood 
Following the dissolution of the USSR, and the subsequent inter-state integration tendencies, in 
2007 Russia, BelaƌƵƐĂŶĚ<ĂǌĂŬŚƐƚĂŶ ?ĂƚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶĂƵŐƵƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĞƵƌĂƐŝĂŶƵƐƚŽŵƐ
Union (ECU). The latter is an (alternative) Russian-led region-building project in the post-Soviet 
space (Eurasian Economic Commission 2013). The construction of the ECU and the EEU is claimed 
to have followed ƚŚĞh ?ƐƐƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů integration model (Putin 2011; Dragneva and Wolczuk 
2015, Tsygankov 2015), and has considerably moved apace from signing the initial treaty on the 
ECU Commission and Common Territory (2007), to establishing the ECU in 2011, and a single 
economic space (SES) in 2012. The launch of the EEU took place in 2015, with further expansion 
of its membership to include Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, and prospectively Tajikistan, Turkey and 
Iran. Noting this fast-flowing regional integration, Vladimir Putin commented:  
It took Europe 40 years to move from the European Coal and Steel Community to the full 
European Union. The establishment of the Customs Union and the Common Economic 
Space is proceeding at a much faster pace because we could draw on the experience of the 
EU and other regional associations. We see their strengths and weaknesses. And this is our 
obvious advantage since it means we are in a position to avoid mistakes and unnecessary 
bureaucratic superstructures (2011). 
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The key features of this alternative, Russia-centred integration project allegedly include market 
harmonisation and interest-driven multilateral economic partnerships, predominately initiated 
and led by Russia. The EEU, as Dragneva and Wolczuk observed (2015), has developed alongside 
ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ tdK ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ?and is intended to be guided by the WTO laws to 
harmonise EEU legal provisions. By compelling the neighbouring countries to this new integration 
initiative, Russia was hoping to enhance its regional competitiveness predicated on historic 
interdependencies and its hegemony across the post-Soviet space. 
The objectives of the EEU, as the then Russian Deputy prime minister and now the chairman of 
the Eurasian Commission, Victor Khristenko argued, were extending far beyond the post-Soviet 
space than is conventionally assumed:   
Russia is interested in integration with its neighbours in the CIS and in developing relations 
with the EU. These two are not alternative directions  ? they mutually complement each 
other: an alliance of post-Soviet republics will be better positioned to develop relations with 
Europe (in Menkiszak 2013 p.31).  
Khristenko also observed that these two regional processes could progress independently, in 
iƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶ ? Žƌ ? ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ?  ‘ƚŚĞǇ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ůŝŶŬĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚƵƐ ŵƵƚƵĂůůǇ ĞŶƌŝĐŚ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ĂŶĚ
gradually consolidate a sphere of economic integration which, in terms of population, would be 
three times as big as Russian. We think that for us the second variant is preferable and more 
ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? Why in this case, did the two initiatives never connect in a cooperative manner, 
and proceeded to develop in isolation? As Dragneva and Wolczuk (2015) contend, Russia, just 
like the EU, saw the integration process predominantly through its own interests in expanding 
its own sphere of influence:  by way of bureaucratisation, compulsion and hard bargaining it has 
been nudging neighbours to commit to the Eurasian economic integration course  W which, from 
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ĚŬŝŶƐ ? ƉĞƌƐpective, effectively betrays the  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? of intended boundary expansion of the 
established knowledge regime by Russia to exert influence and control. And yet again, this 
expansion has been undertaken without further contestation or canvasing; instead compelling 
ŽĨ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂƌƚ-and-ŵŝŶĚƐ ? ǁĞŶƚ ŚĂŶĚ ŝŶ ŚĂŶĚ ǁŝƚŚ ďƌƵƚĂů ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ďůĂĐŬŵĂŝůŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌƐ ?ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚhe view that was communicated to Ukraine 
ďǇ WƵƚŝŶ ǁĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĂƚ ƵƐƚŽŵƐ hŶŝŽŶ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ĂŶĚ Ă &d ǁŝƚŚ the EU were compatible ?
(Dragneva and Wolczuk 2015, p.69), on the condition that Ukraine followed the Russian 
integration course. This would have required Ukraine  ‘to abandon bilateral negotiations with the 
EU, and join the Eurasian regime to achieve free ƚƌĂĚĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?  ?bid). When Ukraine 
however rejected the Eurasian offer of membership, Russia opted for denouncing the European 
integration course as harmful to the Customs Union and the CIS economy as a whole (Ibid p.70). 
As Dragneva and Wolczuk arŐƵĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? ‘ƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶǁĂƐ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?ŽŶĚĞǀŝƐŝŶŐĂŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
veto mechanism rather seeking functional solutions to specific problems arising from potential 
ƌĞŐŝŵĞŽǀĞƌůĂƉƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ p. ? ? ? ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽŶhŬƌĂŝŶe 
was not necessarily on economic grounds, but rather driven by political motifs (HoL 2015, Ch.5 
p.5). The two integration regimes clearly clashed, because each was pushing for their own rules 
of the game  ? ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?, without contestation, or indeed consideration  ? ‘ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ?of the 
interests and needs of the third party  W Ukraine as the target country and the eastern region 
more broadly. As Dragneva and Wolczuk aptly put it: 
Both Russia and the EU ignore the role of the third and most important party  ? Ukraine 
itself ? It is undeniable that the protest and war brought into a sharp relief the growing 
rivalry between the EU and Russia, with both actors offering alternative regimes for 
ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞƐĞ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƉƵƌƐƵĞĚ ŝŶ ƉĂƌĂůůĞů ƌĂƚŚĞƌ
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than in harmony with each other. Yet, Ukraine has not been a mere bystander waiting to 
see what is being offered (2015 p.3) 
From competing to incompatible Selfdoms of the EU and Russia? 
The EaP and the EEU Self-assertive integration projects, by their design, objectives and general 
rules of the game  W both WTO-ƉƌĞŵŝƐĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌĞǀĞŶĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞh ?ƐƉƌŽƚŽƚǇƉĞ W are 
not at all dissimilar. At the same time, where they seem to diverge irreconcilably is in the area of 
their normative regimes. Each established order seeks to inculcate their own authority and the 
bureaucracy of rules to maintain and expand their governance over the overlapping region, 
which they do by way of politics (respective ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ‘the political ?to 
generate discussion and seek compromise for reciprocal solutions and joint interests.  
In this case, what about the grand vision of a Greater Europe which by the mid-2010s has been 
reduced and fragmented to the many smaller and irreconcilable fragments of Europe? Is a 
 ‘ƵŶŝƚĞĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƵƌŽƉĞ ?at all feasible, and would a dialogue between the two blocs  W the EU 
and the EEU  W enable a constructive solution to the current standoff? While both sides 
individually agree on the necessity of inter-regional cooperation, especially in economic and 
security terms, none is prepared to imagine and negotiate a new order of things  W cohabitation, 
rather than regional hegemony. The ŽǀĞƌůĂƉƉŝŶŐ  ‘ŐƌĂŶĚ ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?  W or the production of the 
individual regimes of  ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?  W by the EU and Russia, however, falls short when coming to 
implementation, thus often resembling more a tug-of-war than regional cooperation to achieve 
global presence and market expansion by mutual agreement. While the EU demands 
convergence with its acquis, claimed to be incompatible with the EEU standards; Russia 
conversely, although envisaging a prospective application of the WTO rules to the EEU, operates 
more through compulsion and dependency arguments bearing the mark of the Soviet times.9 
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The EU and Russia cleaƌůǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ. At the 
same time, they ƌĞũĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ďĂĐŬ ŽŶ ƚŽ ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁŽƵůĚ
invariably challenge their self-purported authority but may open space for re-negotiation of their 
orders and visions, on reciprocal terms  W as part of othering and aligning different normalities 
(Foucault 2007).  
And yet, in this acknowledgement of their overlapping interests, they continue to fail to 
understand, let alone to facilitate the need for interface and trialogue over and with the region, 
ƚƌĞĂƚŝŶŐŝƚĂƐĂ ‘ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ^ĞůǀĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ
of their ambitions. In this vein, they continue their promotion of overlapping but disjoined 
projects in the region  W ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? involving freedom of choice 
and contestation  W which in 2013, owing to their highly depoliticised  ?ŝŶĚŬŝŶƐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?
focus on economic integration, led to the eruption of conflict in Ukraine. While recognising the 
ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞhĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĨĂůůƐŚŽƌƚŽĨĚŝƐĐĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƌĞƐĞŵďůĞ
ŵŽƌĞ ŽĨ ĂŶ  ‘ŽƐƚƌŝĐŚ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝŶ Ă ďůŝŶŬĞƌĞĚ ƉƵƌƐƵŝƚ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ƚĞĐŚŶŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ
efforts, conversely, caused much turmoil in the region, spreading fear even amongst the 
converted (Noucheva 2014). The decision to begin triangulating ƚŚĞhĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ
with Ukraine came rather late in 2014, as a consequence of war and the negotiated ceasefire in 
Ukraine (Council 2014). The format of this trialogue however is not of cooperation, but rather of 
parallel and isolated intentions: while the EU aims to mobilise the agreement, Russia seeks to 
veto it altogether (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2015; Tsygankov 2015; Wiegand and Schulz 2015).  
The consequences of these parallel regional intentions have been debilitating for the region and 
global order, exposing its hegemonic and unsustainable nature. These developments lead us to 
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seriously question the intentions of othering by both powers. Two particular manifestations 
become apparent.  
First, in their Self-centred projections, both the EU and Russia have explicitly disregarded each 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĂƐ&ƌĞƵĚŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?ŝƐƚŽďĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚŝŶ
the competing worlds of Selfdoms. In particular, the EU focused on the default assumption that 
ƚŚĞĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞŽĨhŬƌĂŝŶĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨƚŚĞh ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŽĨĂ ‘ǁĞůů-
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚƌŝŶŐŽĨĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ? ?ĐĞŶƚƌĞĚŽŶƚŚĞh ?ǁŽƵůĚĞŶĂďůĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƐto unequivocally legitimise 
the European course. This was clearly an error of judgement, not only in terms of the timing to 
ŚĂƌǀĞƐƚ ĂůůĞŐŝĂŶĐĞƐ ? ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ? ŵŽƌĞ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ? ŝŶ ĨĂŝůŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĨĂĐƚŽƌ ZƵƐƐŝĂ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ
expansionist normative modus operandi.  
Second, and most significantly, both powers evidently failed to understand the region itself and 
its historical urge for complementary rather than dichotomous relations with the wider Europe. 
As the following research findings10 indicate both powers yield similarly appealing offers in the 
eastern neighbourhood, which, instead of mobilising binary loyalties, foster an ambivalence of 
choice for the peoples in the eastern region: in 2013/14 a healthy plurality (40 per cent on 
average) of the polled respondents across Belarus and Moldova indicated attractiveness of both 
regional projects. Furthermore, a temporal cross-regional comparison 11  reveals that both 
powers appeal to the residents of the region, in their own, complementary way: while the EEU 
is seen as important for energy security and trade; the EaP and the EU have stronger clout in 
promoting functional government and effective sector-specific cooperation. Enforcing a 
dichotomous choice on the region, not yet ready for making these commitments through their 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐĞĚŶŽƌŵƐŽĨďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ƚĞƐƚŝĨŝĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚůĂĐŬŽĨƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘KƚŚĞƌ ? W the 
partner countries  W including their needs and aspirations. The error of judgement by the EU and 
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the loss of control by Russia are, in an equal measure, the causalities of the decision-making 
process which occurred in the vacuum of correlated knowledge about the Other, resulting in 
depoliticisation  W ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝǀĞƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ‘ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐŽĨƚƌƵƚŚ ? ?ĚŬŝŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?
and subsequent securitisation of the contestable narratives, as the case of Ukraine has lately 
demonstrated.  
dŚĞďŝŐŐĞƌƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŚĞƌĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂŶĚŚŽǁƚŚĞhĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐĐŽƵůĚďĞ
defused and re-politicised in their rhetorical furnishings, to return to a zone of peaceful 
coexistence, rather than the explicitly  ‘ŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞĚƚƌƵƚŚ ?ŽŶďŽƚŚƐŝĚĞƐ ?ƐŽƵƌĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞ
research conducted in 2008-9 (en7) and 2013-14 (en6) indicate, the normative framing of 
discourses continues to conflict in a profound way but they are not necessarily insurmountable. 
Both powers profess and are associated with differing sets of values which in turn support and 
engineer different behavioural patterns and expectations. Notably, the EU is clearly identified as 
a liberal democratic model, premised on the values of democracy, human rights, market 
economic, and the lack of corruption; and the spatial analysis of 2009 and 2014 public 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚĂƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞĞŶĚƵƌĂŶĐĞ ŽĨƚŚŝƐŵŽĚĞů ŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚ-ƐĞƚƐ ? ?At the same 
ƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞhĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĞǇĞƐ ?ŽĨĨĞƌĂŵŝǆŽĨƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŚǇďƌŝĚĐĂƐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
could be referred to as a social democratic model, but which could potentially approximate the 
EU especially along the values of market economy, stability, economic prosperity, and security, 
and at the same time retain its cultural uniqueness. Furthermore, the 2014 findings suggest there 
is more proximity in these values than was publicly purported in the earlier days of the EaP, which 
could avail some prospects for economic cooperation as optimal space if mutually agreed rules 
were to be considered, and othering were to take place between the involved parties .  
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ǣǮǯand the new social order 
Drawing on the above, and with reference to the preceding conceptualisation of  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨothering, it becomes apparent that the relational nature of power 
is far more complex and essentially understudied than is currently understood. In order to 
survive and more importantly,  sustain itself, it requires, as in the world of nature, the recognition 
of the Other vis-à-vis the Self, which would enable the Self to treat the outside in its own right 
and distinction, and not as a simple extension of the Self.  
The pursuit of SĞůĨĚŽŵƐ ǁŚŝůĞ  ‘ĨŽƌŐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞOther is dangerous and unsustainable. First, 
instead of knowledge and learning about the other, the established regimes, as a rule, resort to 
fantasies and the proĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ĞůĨ-vision. Knowledge regimes and 
ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞďĞĐŽŵĞƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚďǇŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞĚ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚĞƉůŽǇƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ
and discourse, to inculcate itself onto the outside. The language becomes not a tool for the 
promotion of ideas, but a harness to embed the logic of the established order ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?
rather than contestation  ? ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ?. As has been shown in the case of Ukraine, the framing 
ŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ‘ƉůĂŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĨůĂŐ ?ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ďĞĐĂŵĞĂconflictual matter, 
leading to the breaking of a dialogue between the EU and Russia, and the eruption of Ukraine. 
Transmitting narratives, produĐŝŶŐ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ? ?ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞ  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ŽĨƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶĐƵůƉƌŝƚƐĐŽƵůĚďĞ
either disruptive or peace-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ?ƉĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂǇĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘ĨƌŽǌĞŶ ?ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐŽƌĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?
to a prospective normalisation  W that is, involving the interplay between differing normalities 
(Foucault 2007)  W and cooperation. It remains to be seen how the new negotiations over the 
respective regional FTAs will proceed in defusing tensions between the EU and Russia over and 
across the region.  
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In the meantime, while Russia remains exclusionary in the pursuit and expansion of its regional 
authority, the EU has gone through a wide-reaching consultation and reform to make its policies 
more effective and sustainable in the neighbourhood. Collected public evidence corroborated 
our previous discussion and testified to the fact ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh ?Ɛ ‘ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇŚĂs 
been regarded by other partners as too prescriptive, and as not sufficiently reflecting their 
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ?ommission 2015 p.3). While reflecting on these criticisms, the 
Commission has expectedly proposed ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŵƵƚƵĂů ŽǁŶership will the 
ŚĂůůŵĂƌŬƐ ŝĨ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ EW ? ?ĂŶĚ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞd ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁEW ǁŝůů ŶŽǁƐĞĞŬ ƚŽ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ
regional actors, beyond the neighbourhood, where appropriate, in addressing the regional 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ?-3). At the same time, while the new narratives intend to be reinvigorating 
and flexible, accounting for the needs of partners, and the presence of other actors in the region, 
there is a strong feeling that the same old practices are likely to persist. In seemingly recognising 
the outside as different and diverse in its aspirations, the Commission however pledges to 
prioritise stability ?ŝŶŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĚŽŝŶŐƐŽ ? ‘ƚŚĞhǁŝůůƉƵƌƐƵĞŝƚƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ
ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůǀĂůƵĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞh ?ƐŽǁŶƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ?KŶĐĞŵŽƌĞ ?
the EU is prepared to face the outside as the extension of its own Self, in the process of 
externalising its interests and rules of the established internal order.    
To close this discussion of politics, the political and othering, we must insist that a new framing 
of international relations is needed. This would infer in the first instance developing a more 
discerning approach to the EaP partner countries by the EU, and Russia, in order to understand 
their needs and prospective difficulties, and to send the right signal to the eastern 
neighbourhood, which seeks complementarity rather competition between the respective 
regional projects. Rather than competition and struggle for dominance, there has to be 
cooperation between these projeĐƚƐ ? ŝĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐƌĂŶĚ ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌƐ  W for a 
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sustainable (rather than hegemonic) pan-European single space, premised on reclaiming 
othering and re-politicising the authority of the Self  W were to be achieved.  
Notes 
1. dŚŝƐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĂ ‘ƵŶŝƚĞĚƵƌŽƉĞ ?ǁĂƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƌĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇWƵƚŝŶŝŶŚŝƐƐƉĞĞĐŚŝŶ ? ? ? ? 
2.  /ŶƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ‘ƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?ŝs viewed as an important referent object in defining the outside. To date, the 
ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶŵĂŝŶůǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞůĞŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞůĨ ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌǁĂƐ
seen as instrumental but not necessarily as pari passu, to the construction of the Self in its external 
projection (Diez 2005; Flockhart 2010; Neumann 1999). We argue, however, that this recognition of the 
Other is not sufficient and requires its affirmation and empowerment as an equally constitutive part of 
the relational world of power (Edkins 1999:24). 
3. For more discussion see Korosteleva, E. et al. (forthcoming)  ‘ ?dŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ?dŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
ĂƐƚĞƌŶWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ PƌĞƐŚĂƉŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? ?special issue, East European Politics 2016; Edkins 
1999, Foucault 2007 
4. While the nature of  ‘the Self ? is recognised as referential, its understand nevertheless does not extend 
to treat the Other as pari passu. Instead, the Other is often viewed either as the projection of the Self, or 
indeed as a different kind (and inferior or threat as a rule). Our post-structuralist interpretation of the 
Other calls for a more nuanced meaning of the Other, which is seen as complementary and yet distinct to 
the Self, in defining the outside. See Korosteleva et al (forthcoming 2017) for further discussion 
5. Hence, the initial inclusion into the ENP of Russia (subsequently rejected by the latter), and almost 
incidental - of the Southern Caucasus. For more discussion see Korosteleva 2012; Delcour 2015 
6 ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐǁŝƚŚCommission officials in 2012 
7. Opinion polls were conducted by the author in Belarus in 2013 and Moldova in 2014; findings have 
been corroborated by other survey sources. For more information visit 
http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec/research/index.html    
8. EU region-building policies de facto assume the primacy of economic inter-regional cooperation, 
without a prospect of EU membership for the willing partners    
9. This distinction is further underscored by significant normative differences between the EU and the 
EEU. As our research indicates, these differences are profound and enduring, with the EU being associated 
with a liberal model of democracy, while the EEU and its member states  W ǁŝƚŚĂŚǇďƌŝĚĐĂƐĞŽĨ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚ
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂĐƵƌŝŽƵƐŵŝǆŽĨŵĂƌŬĞƚĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƚŽůĞƌĂŶĐĞ ?ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂů
traditionalism. For more information see Korosteleva 2013; Kurki 2010  
10 . For more details  see the 2013-14 research results available at: 
http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec/research/index.html  
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